

PARTICULARITIES OF GENESIS AND FUNCTIONING OF THE DEEP STATE WITHIN VARIOUS POLITICAL REGIMES

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Abstract: The paper deals with analyzing particularities of genesis and functioning of the deep state within various political regimes. A deep state is a networking structure integrating various interest groups in a low-profile format; its resource superiority enables it to control the country's social and political process partially or completely. With the course of time, it is procuring of reproduction of its structure that inevitably becomes the priority aim of the deep state. It can take on numerous quite specific forms; meanwhile, its power can be ensured both by the military and security resources and by less heavy-handed means.

Keywords: deep state, genesis, networking structure, Iran, Pakistan, USA, Turkey.

1 Introduction

In recent years, the term "Deep state" has been used within the discourse of political science increasingly extensively. D. Trump's actions as the US President, his losing the 2020 election, as well as domestic political events of the USA accompanying it, spurred the growth of interest of the general public and representatives of the expert community in the topic of the "Deep state" (Osnos, 2018; Travkina, 2020). However, debate of the said question was largely rendered unconstructive due to attempts to marginalize this concept.

Alongside the essence of this term getting distorted by both its supporters and opponents, appeals for abandoning this concept and explanatory models associated with it voiced by some politicians and columnists generate the necessity of making the content of this scientific concept more precise by summing up new conceptual approaches and empirical data.

As previously noted by the authors, analysis of the functioning of any socio-political system necessarily requires, first of all, the creation of its "non-material image", i.e., an information and mathematical model. The corresponding stage of scientific research requires the researcher to ensure that the constructed models are as close as possible to the real subject of research. However, in practice, this requirement is often forced to be violated, in particular, due to the impact of such a factor as a lack of information" (Pronchev & Mikhailov, 2020, p. 434-435).

The principal task of this paper is to find out general and specific particularities of functioning of the deep state within various political regimes for constructing a mathematical model of functioning of the deep state further on. For methodology of mathematical modeling of systems which are difficult to formalize, one can consult the monograph by A. A. Samarskii and A. P. Mikhailov (2002). A similar approach was in use earlier, for example, for mathematical modeling of clans as a factor of political system (Pronchev & Mikhailov, 2020; Mikhailov & Pronchev, 2020), corruption (Mikhailov et al., 2013; Mikhailov & Gorbatikov, 2016), and various aspects of information warfare (Mikhailov et al., 2018; Petrov et al., 2018; Petrov & Proncheva, 2019; Petrov & Proncheva, 2020).

2 Literature Review

The concept of a deep state (sometimes, the term "Parallel state" is used instead) came to be employed as a means of interpreting the system of political institutions at the end of the 20th century. This term (which is the Derin devlet concept directly translated from Turkish) was first used to denote low-profile power institutions supplementing or substituting themselves for official agencies of political administration in states of the Near and Middle East. As for the scientific community, growth of interest in the said range of topics was largely associated with

consequences of the Susurluk scandal of 1996 during which the fact of close cooperation maintained among Turkey's official authorities, Armed Forces management, security and intelligence agencies, organized criminal gangs, and extremist formations was brought to light. Shortly afterwards, experts could confirm work of a similar symbiosis model of these organizations out of public view in Pakistan, India, and Egypt. Later on, researchers started revealing similar political cooperation formats even in Western polyarchies and manifestations of activity of the deep state as far as at the international level, too. In this case, one can cite close cooperation of the authorities of Mexico and the USA with the Guadalajara cartel within financing the activity of anti-government forces in Nicaragua in the 1980s as an illustrative example (Ponkin, 2019).

Existence of the rich empirical material having pronounced national specific features in most cases has brought about the variety of approaches to interpreting the concept of a deep state.

B. Oran used this term to mean a structure within which particular politicians or institutions forming the system of state administration gain an opportunity to complete their own tasks in a borderline illegal way (Oran, 2006). A. Almashat and S. Thabet (2019) interpreted a deep state as a system of organizations and individuals defending corporate interests in a secretive form and for this purpose controlling the course of the political process. Meanwhile, it was noted that the deep state is built beyond the context of democratic administration procedures, has no legitimacy, and appropriates the political power in fact. M. Gunter (2008) defines the deep state as a covert system of decision-making and coordinating actions which unites representatives of political leadership, economic powers-that-be, security, defense, and law enforcement agencies. P. Scott (2013) details the essence of the deep state viewing it as a total of military and security services and/or their staff which is actually autonomous in relation to other elements of the state administration system. According to this approach, the distinctive feature of the deep state is their overriding the rule of law which they substantiate by the necessity to protect the state and society from actual or assumed existential threats (Scott, 2013).

D. Hellinger (2019) interpreted a deep state as an elaborate networking structure which unites representatives of various authorities, first of all, military and security services, and enables them to undermine execution of the political course of the formal head of the state or government, if necessary, or even get him or her removed from the said position.

E. Mérieau (2016) detailed the meaning of the concept under study by an explanatory model which assumes existence of an organized hierarchical autonomous structure incorporating representatives of various authorities (military and security services, judicial system, and so on). It is not seamless; quite frequently, it unites agents considering each other to be competitors. However, the effect of entropy factors is leveled out by their shared interests. In this viewpoint, the deep state is only partially controlled by public authorities or not subordinated to them at all. Deep state structures influence trends of the political process in an indirect way, first of all, by tampering public opinion and fabricating artificial crises. According to this approach, the deep state is anti-democratic in its nature. The objective of its existence is to deprive the broad public of real political subjectness and keep them in such a condition subsequently (Mérieau, 2016).

According to R. Gingeras (2011), a deep state is a system of political interaction among factions within the authorities and beyond them which are not recognized overtly or even are unidentifiable. This concept implies that the deep state is heterogeneous in nature, and it incorporates not only representatives of the state power system. However, it still is law enforcement authorities, security, and intelligence agencies that

play the key part in its structure because the latter hold the monopoly for wording and carrying out national security policy. This lodges them with a wide range of opportunities in terms of influencing the society and other groups of elites (by fearmongering, using damaging material, repressing directly, or organizing clashes with some external forces) (Gingeras, 2011).

M. Lofgren (2016) considers a deep state to be a hybrid structure uniting representatives of security and intelligence agencies, law enforcement authorities, defense, financial, and foreign services, as well as the business community segment affiliated with them. Relying on the empirical data collected within studies of the US political system, the researcher concludes that in the present-day USA, the deep state, despite its non-democratic nature, is still partially controlled by the public power system: functioning of deep state structures is coordinated by the Presidential Administration via the National Security Council of the USA (Lofgren, 2016).

According to S. A. Modestov (2018), a deep state is a system of concentrating the political decision-making opportunities in the hands of individual groups of civil servants and representatives of expert communities associated with them. The political administration function is carried out by the deep state by creating informal institutions of decision-making and approval. These groups within the deep state conglomerate are closely connected with elites and oriented to achieving goals viewed as strategic for the state machinery by the factions of powers-to-be, accordingly (Modestov, 2018).

The authors believe that as a deep state has its own distinctive features, it can be considered a networking structure uniting diverse influence groups (for example, representatives of business and finance affiliated among them, state authorities, local self-government ones, mass media, public organizations and movements, and various criminal gangs) into a single system in a low-profile format. At the expense of resources it possesses, the deep state can partially or completely control the country's social and political process, substituting itself for the official legal administration system in fact. The deep state is first of all oriented to procuring of reproduction of its structure and achieving the strategic aims of its constituent influence groups.

The characteristic feature of the deep state is reproduction of counterpart institutions primed by its functioning. Usually, this process violates the procedure of interaction between the civil society and the state (Pronchev et al., 2016; Pronchev et al., 2018), which triggers the growth of mistrust in the official power. Attempts of resolving the controversies within the above system do not generally yield a positive outcome because virtually all actions of the state can be undermined by the deep state. Nevertheless, the resulting situation leads to a part of the civil society developing rancor and demanding transformations of the system of administration. In fact, this is requirement of forced renewal of the state power and, as a consequence, eradication of the existing deep state. Thus, the long-term stable existence of the deep state can be provided either by periodical large-scale concessions to the broad population or by distracting the civil society from the problems amassed. This can be achieved, for example, by engaging in an external conflict or using various tools of terror against the civil society. So, quite frequently, the authorities of Columbia or Mexico in fact cede the control of certain regions to criminal gangs. As a result, a significant proportion of the civil society migrates to other regions or countries or switch to the individual survival model (Pronchev et al., 2019; Sushko & Pronchev, 2021).

3 Research Methodological Framework

The objective of this research is analysis of particularities of genesis and functioning of the deep state within various political regimes.

The principal research tasks are as follows:

1. to analyze methodological approaches to the study of the concept "deep state";

2. to analyze deep state accomplishment cases within various political regimes;
3. to find out the correlation between the form in which the deep state is materialized and the current political regime.

Methodology of the work is derived from the combination of structural and comparative analysis elements.

The empirical basis of the research consists of cases of the USA, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran.

4 Results and Discussion

4.1 Methodological approaches to the study of the deep state

In most cases, the study of functioning of the deep state conceptually relies on variants of the functional representation theory; among these, it is the neo-corporatist approach that is the most popular one with researchers.

The theory of functional representation interprets relations between the state and society as a series of interactions between interest groups who word, defend, and promote needs of social, political, or economic communities within the context of the process of goods distribution (Peregudov et al., 1999).

A. Bentley notes that as a rule, interest groups have a complex structure incorporating representatives of business, authorities, mass media, public organizations, and expert platforms. With regard to this, their integration is ensured by extensive horizontal mobility. So, owing to their ramified associations within power agencies and an understanding of intricacies of their functioning, retired public servants can always count on some interest on the part of HR managers of large companies. Equally, representatives of top management of private corporations frequently hold elected positions, including those in the system of regional vertical of power within territories which are strategically significant for the company (Bentley, 1949). As noted by S. V. Rastorguev (2016), this kind of "mutual exchange" is a natural consequence of human resources circulating between the state and business – which occurs in corruption-laden forms, among other things. In particular, civil servants or their family members can be included on the executive board of large commercial organizations or get the title to a part of the company's assets (Rastorguev, 2016).

D. Truman (1951) placed emphasis on the fact that interest groups can interact with the state in an informal way and stressed the importance of integrating into certain interactions of marginalized structures (first of all, criminal gangs) and previously discriminated social strata. The latter is associated with the interest groups' consistent aspiration to expand their resource base and array of political tools, as well as getting all potentially accessible decision-making centers under their control (Truman, 1951).

M. Olson (1965) notes that within developed economies, it is to business structures which act as centers of crystallization of interest groups and unite around themselves subsidiaries operating in various spheres of public life that the role of leading political actors belongs in reality (Olson, 1965).

Ph. Schmitter (1974) emphasizes that interest groups possess mechanisms for controlling the process of HR decision-making in the state administration and they are also vested with unofficial monopoly of wording demands and suggestions concerning the public power. Without their support, for certain agencies, it may be next to impossible to carry out their functions successfully (Schmitter, 1974).

Importantly, neo-corporatism rates the specific ways of interaction of interest groups as follows: in spite of the competition existing among them, these communities still demonstrate an inclination to cooperate within providing for strategic interests of powers-to-be (Shapkin, 2016).

Accordingly, in terms of the functional representation theory, the deep state can be viewed as a product of the process of delegating representation of social and economic corporations' interests to certain groups of leadership elite. Its gradual evolution has contributed to the representation institutions getting out of touch with their social base and, at the same time, has led to emergence of stable networking structures uniting various interest groups.

4.2 Examples of materialization of the deep state within various political regimes

Practice shows that particular forms of manifestation of the deep state can vary considerably, depending on the certain country's background: circumstances of origin of political regimes in question, power and stability of public political institutions, scope of civil activism, and economic development.

As for the case of polyarchies, the deep state control of the political process is performed with most formal democratic procedures observed; meanwhile, elements of coercion are either not in use at all or used in mild forms not turning into terror toward opponents (I. Almashat & Thabet, 2019).

So, in the USA, the deep state system relies mainly on the specific circumstances of functioning of horizontal and vertical mobility institutes, as well as on blurring of partisan division boundaries. On the one hand, the personnel circulate continuously between large companies and the state authorities. In this case, it is Facebook's HR policy that can be an example. Since 2013, this social network has vested organization of the content moderation in M. Bickert who previously held the U.S. Attorney office (FNVP, 2019b). Her team is formed partially from former Defense workers, and partially from those employed by the White House when the Presidential Office was held by B. H. Obama II (FNVP, 2019b). Global security service of Apple Inc. is largely manned by former staff members of the National Security Agency of the USA and Pentagon, too (Hoskin & Mostrous, 2020).

At the same time, both current and former civil servants are extensively engaged in the work of numerous nonprofit organization which are post-partisan in nature and closely affiliated with big business. For example, Twitter cooperated with The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) within creation of Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD), a bipartisan transatlantic group with its stated aim of "countering efforts by Russia to undermine democratic institutions in the United States and Europe". Members of Advisory Council of this organization include R.H. Ledgett, former deputy director of NSA; M.J. Morell, former acting CIA director; M. Chertoff, former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, and M.S. Rogers, former chair of the House Intelligence Committee (FNVP, 2019a).

Convention of many American politicians' partisan affiliation is also confirmed by A.A. Schwarzenegger's message blaming D.J. Trump of seeking a coup in January, 2021. Formally, this could be considered as gross violation of party discipline by the high-ranking Republican. It was his support that predetermined J. McCain's winning primaries on the eve of the 2008 election, which vividly characterizes his position on the Republican side. However, A.A. Schwarzenegger's actions did not cause any tangible reaction with the Republican powers-to-be. While he was married to M. Shriver, he had time to build a solid bond with the Democratic Kennedy "clan" the representatives of which go on playing a serious part within leadership elite of the USA. So, J.P. Kennedy III is currently a member of the Congress House of Representatives, and C.B. Kennedy held the office of the US ambassador in Japan until 2017. A.A. Schwarzenegger's founding of the Institute for State and Global Policy at the University of Southern California is remarkable; its official mission is to advance "post-partisanship" within powers-to-be of the USA. Finally, it draws attention to itself that his belonging to the Republicans has not prevented A.A. Schwarzenegger from supporting the Democratic stance on such

questions as the legal status of abortions and rights of LGBT (VN, 2021).

Alongside business grandees' merging with administrative elite and partisan boundaries getting leveled out, the formation and development of the deep state in the USA is furthered by "preservation" of the top echelons of the political elite. So, according to the 2019 data, 45 of 100 US Senators belonged to the age group of 65 to more than 80 years old. Meanwhile, many Senators older than 80 held key positions in the upper chamber of the Congress: C.E. Grassley chaired the United States Senate Committee on Finance, R.C. Shelby – the Senate Appropriations Committee, and J.M. Inhofe was head of the Committee on Armed Services. As of the same date, 16 of 535 MC did their duties continuously for over 40 years. The age of 27 governors of states out of 50 was over 60, with the average age being 62 years old (Travkina, 2020).

Meanwhile, a significant proportion of representatives of the political body largely "inherit" their offices. In this case, some high-ranking politicians, such as N. Pelosi, E. Cheney and some others, can be a vivid example (Hellinger, 2019).

At the same time, reduction of chances for an "average American" to make a career in politics is observed. According to the US National Center for Education Statistics, the average college fee for 4 years of tuition tripled over the period of 1963 – 2015. Meanwhile, in the USA, real earnings of middle-class households shrank by 8% as early as within 2000 – 2012. The increment of the amount of debt on "student loans" in the country made 100% over the period of 2009 – 2017 (with the total amount climbing above USD 1,3 trillion). According to the data of Pew Research Center, within 1970 – 2014, the proportion of middle-class households went from 62% down to 43% in the USA. Since mid-1970s, the time for a medium-income citizen to save money for the mortgage downpayment has increased from 5 to 14 years. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the proportion of the US citizens aged 25 – 37, not married, and living with their parents has gone up to over 20%. 22 million of the said people have a higher education. A consequence of advance of these trends included lower vertical mobility, a more pronounced trend of HR lock-in of the interest groups, and a higher extent of their control of the political decision-making process. Another consequence was a larger gap between the bulk of the population and representatives of the deep state (Hellinger, 2019).

As for authoritarian political regimes, circumstances of genesis of the deep state have resulted in following democratic or merely formal political procedures more in the form of their symbolic imitation than actual adherence to them. They have also conditioned a broad practice of violence against any opposing forces. By contrast with polyarchies, extremist organizations and criminal gangs, too, are extensively used as a tool of suppression here.

Turkey's deep state was formed partially under the influence of dominance of the military in the political elite and the heritage of secret societies which were formed back in the period of existence of the Ottoman Empire, partially under the effect of the ideology of alarmism shared by the local nationalists from the point of creation of the republic. Cultivation of the political myth about the external threat, alongside the Kemalists' mistrust in the traditionalist-minded ordinary rural population, contributed to elaboration of the anti-democratic political culture. Within the latter, elites were positioned as an only defender and enabler of the principles of construction of a secular republic in Turkey, capable of ensuring its economic development, scientific and technical advance. At the same time, militarized nationalist organizations were extensively formed in the country. The most well-known and influential one among them is Bozkurtlar. By means of special underground forces, such as Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele, the military closely interacted with ethnic Turkish gangs abroad, organized crime within the country, and right-wing extremists. This alliance was directed mainly against the left-wing opposition and political organizations of ethnic minorities, the Kurds first of all. The

high level of autonomy and secrecy of the deep state agencies, alongside their having an undeclared permission for extensive use of violence, ensured their stability for a long time. During the years of 1985 – 2000, 35 thousand people were killed as a result of actions of the so-called "death squads". However, after R.T. Erdoğan's accession to power and the failed coup attempt of 2016, the process of consolidation of the political dominance brought about a distinct reduction in the extent of independence of the deep state agencies (Gingeras, 2011).

Specific features of the deep state in Pakistan are associated with India's frozen conflict, the country's closeness to Afghanistan haunted by civil war, and its political heritage of the period of gaining independence. The presence of threat on the part of its Eastern neighbor, later introduction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, too, and the practice of coordinating joint operations against the USSR with the USA, mainly along the line of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), determined several parallel trends in the development of the state administration system. Firstly, the military won dominance in the sphere of political decision-making. Secondly, ISI was endowed with authorities required for controlling the domestic opposition, gained extensive autonomy, underwent Islamization and fragmentation. Due to that, the formally uniform security and intelligence agency got several decision-making centers at a time. On top of that, a number of its structures actually made an alliance with religious extremists, groups of traffickers or drug dealers. Thirdly, in spite of segmentation of the military and security services as the "ruling class", they retained their ability to cooperate in cases of any threats to the current political system emerging (Ponkin, 2019).

In Iran, the specific circumstances of formation of the deep state were first of all associated with A. Khamenei's special position that in fact stood above all branches of power. Secondly, the presence of the "second armed forces" in the country represented by Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps played its part. Thirdly, the said circumstances were brought about by the relative weakness of political institutions against the background of traditionally strong interpersonal relations, and, finally, by the harsh sanction regime. As a result of these factors interacting, Iran got numerous semi-autonomous decision-making centers which were only accountable to the supreme moderator in the person of A. Khamenei. Overlapping each other's functions, the military and security services are not seamless formations, and their constituents can be controlled by different factions of powers-to-be at the same time. Absence of the rigid subordination vertical and the top leaders' interest in maintaining balance among the elites open up the "window of opportunities" for representatives of the latter in terms of illegal use of the security resource for accomplishing their own tasks. In a whole number of Iran's near-border Ostans (provinces), the central authorities wishing to grant the local population an opportunity to provide at least marginally acceptable level of life for them turn a blind eye on their organizing large-scale trafficking. Meanwhile, the deep state agencies use the smugglers' networks extensively for fulfilling their own tasks or participate directly in carrying out suitable schemes to gain an additional source of income. What is worth to be noted individually is that each of the deep state structures controls certain segments of the domestic market directly or indirectly. Political and economic segments of the elite become integrated, with the former constituent clearly dominating (Modestov, 2018).

5 Conclusion

Thus, it can be stated that using the concept "Deep state", a vast array of quite heterogeneous regimes considerably differing in both the form and content is described. However, there is a shared attribute to make all of them related: they are distinguished by worsening dysfunction of formal political administration institutions. The said dysfunction is associated both with external factors and circumstances of the origin of certain political regimes and with specific nature of the adopted social and economic development model. With regard to this, even its representatives can initially perceive the deep state as a

means of compensating for inefficient work of the public power institutions. However, in the end, it inevitably starts prioritizing the task of ensuring its own reproduction above everything.

The deep state can get established both by conspiratorial and coercive ways and in less heavy-handed forms, by de-operationalizing vertical mobility institutions, intensifying the exchange of resources between the private finance and commercial sector and the state, and making the political parties actually converge. Meanwhile, these agencies get out of touch with their initial social base.

As for relations among the deep state segments and within the entire structure, these are largely determined by specific circumstances of the political regime and the economic development level of the state in question. In the case of polyarchies, some kind of balance of interests between the state officials who are members of influence groups and their partners from business community representatives is noted. In more authoritarian regimes, what is observed is dominance of the state power segment ones – security, defense, and law enforcement agencies, first of all.

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