

## POLYCENTRISM OF THE MODERN WORLD AS A GEOPOLITICAL REALITY

<sup>a</sup>IVAN ABLAZOV, <sup>b</sup>VOLODYMYR ABRAMOV, <sup>c</sup>VASYL VERESHCHAK, <sup>d</sup>OLEKSANDR MISHKOV, <sup>e</sup>SERHII KHAMULA

<sup>a</sup>Academy of Ukraine named after Hennadii Udovenko, Kyiv, Ukraine, <sup>b</sup>Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine, <sup>c</sup>Kyiv National Economic University named after Vadym Hetman, Kyiv, Ukraine, <sup>d,e</sup>National Technical University of Ukraine "Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute", Kyiv, Ukraine

Emails: <sup>a</sup>ablazov@ukr.net, <sup>b</sup>v.abr.53@ukr.net, <sup>c</sup>vvg1955@ukr.net, <sup>d</sup>alex\_1369@ukr.net, <sup>e</sup>serhii.khamula@gmail.com

**Abstract:** The article is devoted to the study of the polycentric concept of world politics formation. The research aims to study the current world geopolitics state and model a possible scenario of polycentrism development in the future. According to the study results, the polycentrism of the modern world is based on bipolarity formed by the USA and other countries. In particular, the main rivals today are China and Russia, which can act separately as a geopolitical entity, or combined, creating a weighty area of world influence. The study also shows the importance of interstate political configurations, as the possible development of polycentrism in the direction of small states connection, regional mergers, and the participation of large multinational companies in the field of advanced and information technology.

**Keywords:** polycentrism, bipolarity, geopolitics, IT market, Covid-19

### 1 Introduction

It is clear from world history that no unipolar world can create a solid geopolitical structure because of its conflicting nature. It is only a sign of world politics transition to a new geopolitical era. Such a system is characterized by instability since it inevitably moves to aggressive-power principles of influence on the surrounding world to realize its geopolitical power. The rise of one of the world politics subjects can not last long. Due to overstretched economic resources, weakened domestic leadership, and risky adventures, the hegemon created by several states will cease to be the center of world influence (Kalyuzhnyj, 2010).

One version of a polycentric world is the bipolar model, in which power is distributed almost equally between a pair of hegemonic states. However, despite some stability, such a system cannot exist indefinitely because of the different rates and directions of development. An example is the USSR-US bipolar world after 1945 and before 1991 (Kalyuzhnyj, 2010).

Polycentrism is the geopolitical reality of the current world order. The unification of Europe based on the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 is deepening, despite the withdrawal of the United Kingdom. Also, despite pockets of instability, the Islamic world is increasing in influence. However, the U.S. still has a superpower in the current transition to a polycentric world. Its hegemon position in striving to become one of the poles of the new world is already challenged by India and China. Therefore, we should not forget about strengthening individual states, especially ones that form separate civilizations (China, Japan, India). Also, India and Brazil are becoming strong world players (Kalyuzhnyj, 2010).

At the moment, the main problem, the development of which is impossible to predict, is the severe strengthening of the position on the world stage of transnational companies, which now act as arbitrators of economic and political decisions and challenge the decisions of old political systems (Saran, 2021).

The study aims to examine the current state of world geopolitics and model a possible scenario of polycentrism development in the future.

### 2 Literature review

The theoretical aspects of the formation of polycentrism are quite well studied at the scientific level. It is equally noteworthy the work of Handley J. (2021), which shows the main directions of the movement with a more in-depth theoretical model of the

polycentric world. The issue of polycentrism is quite specific and debatable. So, to show the topic's relevance and the availability of its understanding, Lederleitner M. (2021) thoroughly interprets the idea of polycentrism. He reveals the underlying principles that are common to both polycentrism and religion.

The formation of polycentrism has become especially relevant today when another severe threat to security has emerged: the Covid-19 pandemic. The speakers Bajkov A. *et al.* (2020) are unanimous that the pandemic has not stopped the war between the U.S. and China for technological supremacy. On the contrary, it continues but gives the PRC a respite, as all the country's forces are focused on the fight against COVID-19, which requires significant resources.

Determining the type of modern world order alone, whether bipolar or multipolar, is one of the most ideological issues in international relations (Keersmaecker, 2015). It is fair to say that the science of international relations in general, like any other social discipline, has a significant ideological component. Most American experts declare that the world is unipolar and will remain so for a long time to come, presenting this as an absolute good for humanity. On the other hand, the EU and other BRICS countries argue in favor of a multipolar world.

Each side has its arguments. Thus, in the opinion of the U.S. Secretary of State in 2005-2009, K. Rice, the reality is that "polycentrism has never been a unifying idea or vision. It was a necessary evil that supported the absence of war, but it did not contribute to the triumph of peace. On the contrary, polycentrism is a theory of rivalry; of competing interests and, at worst, of competing values" (Primakov, 2011).

The parties had moved from theoretical discussions to the normative plane of the academic world a long time ago. Thus, supporters of unipolarity rely on the theory of hegemonic stability, which Kindleberger J. originally developed concerning his desired mechanism of world economic governance during the Great Depression (Kindleberger, 1973) and was further developed by experts on international political economy Gilpin G., Keohane, R. and Goldstein J. Proponents of this approach argue that the presence of a hegemon allows to stabilize the global system and is an unconditional good. They refer, for example, to J. Modelski's research on the concentration of maritime power (Modelski, 1988), as well as to C. Rasler, according to whom the emergence of global wars coincides with periods of low concentration of power (Rasler, 1994).

Theoretical elaboration of the polycentrism concept in this respect is still something poorer. In the 1990s, several researchers made several attempts to develop theoretical foundations for a polycentric world, promoting, according to Bogaturov A., the image of a "necessary future", although without proper reliance on the analysis of the power relations (Bogaturov, 2003). Today, it can be argued that the issue is also not sufficiently studied in the scientific literature, which forms the relevance of the research at the scientific level.

### 3 Research Methodology

The study of the polycentrism of the modern world as a geopolitical reality takes place in this research by modeling the main geopolitical models of development. Based on this approach, researchers predict the main trends of development of the system of interstate relations, identify the main confrontational knots in it, and form an idea of both global geopolitical threats and specific threats to the national interests of states generated by certain geopolitical processes.

The essence of geopolitical modeling consists of a structural and genetically functional representation of the world space and the fundamental characteristics of the world structure and parameters of the functionality of the elements of this structure.

Using general scientific methods of cognition, including analysis, synthesis, induction, and deduction, a critical analysis of the literature, which highlights the issues of the polycentric world structure, was conducted. Synthesis of information allows highlighting the main ideas and providing them in the study in a structured and consistent manner. Induction and deduction will enable us to draw conclusions on possible world development scenarios and highlight the author's vision of their problems.

#### 4 Research results

The third decade of the XXI century has forced the world to face its most difficult challenge – how to offer a coherent, collective, and equitable response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This challenge to the beliefs of the most ardent internationalists is part of a profound shake-up in the global order that loomed even before the first COVID-19 case in Wuhan in 2019 (Steward, 2020). It began as U.S. hegemony almost ended, and the rise of a multipolar world entailed a redistribution of influence on the global stage. American leadership, which would have been necessary to intensify collective action against the pandemic, was transformed into a desire to isolate itself from the rest of the world long before former U.S. President Trump launched the “America First” campaign. On the other side of the world, in Europe, the utopian vision of interdependence and global cooperation suffered when Brexit destroyed the ideological and institutional foundations of the European Union. In such circumstances, China, as another great power, became involved in its Pax Sinica project, seeking to make globalization profitable for its communist party.

Global institutions have weakened, and the benefits of investing political will into international mechanisms have diminished considerably. Moreover, the Coronavirus further exacerbated the situation. When the disease began to spread rapidly, countries retaliated alone or with trusted partners and interacted with the international community solely for self-interest. In the end, everyone turned out to be “Darwinists” and gave priority to their survival, not caring about the fate of others.

##### *The bipolarity of the modern polycentric world*

The current world order is characterized by multi-vector polycentrism, caused by the uncoordinated foreign policy activity of new power centers. It provokes the emergence of bipolarity. They emerge within this chaotically formed and not fully formed polycentrism. At the same time, the new global bipolarities are not a copy of the Soviet-American confrontation because they were born under different political and economic circumstances (Garbuzov, 2019).

##### *U.S.-China confrontation*

The main bipolarity today is the confrontation between the U.S. and China. The U.S. remains to this day a superpower, unwilling to give up its position. In turn, China, in the previous 40 years, has become a producer of everything for the whole world and is rapidly increasing its influence at the global level. Therefore, China sees the United States as the most likely threat to its economic and military power today. Thus, the era of U.S. hegemony is winding down, while at the same time, the PRC is becoming the greatest challenge to the existing balance of power. The specific of this confrontation is contemporary interdependence and mutual rejection. So, there is a unique, regulated, and controlled bipolarity model in the polycentric world order (Garbuzov, 2019) (see Tab. 1).

Tab. 1: Scenario of geopolitical development in the context of the confrontation between the U.S. and China

USA	China
Prioritizing global interests over national ones; development of an army that can defend global interests; development of U.S. domestic technological and innovation capabilities; strengthening the alliance system	Strengthening of the army, especially the navy; rapid economic growth, more than 5% a year, development of the technological market; strengthening of local authorities, Belt and Road Initiative development; increasing influence on global institutions and standards

Source: Developed by the authors

The Risk and Forecasting Group, led by Brennen S. (2020), modeled four scenarios of how the world will change in the future. The primary basis for forecasting was the relative power and influence of the United States and the PRC, interaction between them and other significant allies and adversaries of the United States.

The group concluded that forming a new world order is taking place without clear organization and definite direction. The primary influence on the formation of geopolitics in the future will be exerted by the United States and China, or rather the relationship between these world leaders. Regardless of the specific scenario, the U.S. and the PRC's relative influence and interaction will be the dominant factor influencing how geopolitics will be shaped from 2025 to 2035. Depending on the path chosen to establish the new world order, the measure of each state's weakening or the speed of economic recovery after Covid-19 will be determined.

None of the scenarios suggests a wholly positive relationship between the two countries. The only way a fully cooperative relationship could be achieved if common chosen global interests emerged and only if the power and influence of the United States were equal or greater than the power and influence of the Celestial Empire.

##### *The confrontation between the United States and Russia*

The second bipolarity can be considered the confrontation between Russia and the United States. This confrontational axis is vulnerable because it has more geopolitical context than an economic one, so bipolarity is less manageable. In its active politico-economic activities, Russia constantly runs into retaliatory actions by the United States. It makes the rest of the world more chaotic and disorderly. Of course, it leads to new uncertainties and risks. The restoration of a full-fledged dialogue between the countries is only possible if they make mutual concessions. True, this is unlikely because the strategic interests of one state affect the strategic interests of the other (Garbuzov, 2019) (see Tab. 2).

Tab. 2: Scenario of geopolitical development in the context of the confrontation between the United States and Russia

USA	Russia
Strengthening the Alliance at the expense of countries in geographical proximity to Russia; the policy of technological leadership as an instrument of influence on the economic processes of other states.	Increasing political pressure on countries dependent on Russia; forming its own political-military alliance; increased demonstration of combat readiness and military superiority; information warfare and use of hybrid warfare methods; an alliance between Russia and China.

Source: Developed by the authors

The analysis of scenarios for 2025-2035 revealed a lack of stability in relations between the Russian Federation and China. Therefore, it is assumed that cooperation between the countries may have reached the highest level, which will be pretty challenging to maintain.

It turns out that Russia's foreign policy is closely linked to assessing its relative power relative to China and the United States. It has dynamically rebalanced in favor of its indicative superiority.

The technological and military surprises were the “black swans” in 2025-2030. The military application of technology in the scenarios was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Still, technological surprises could not be ruled out, and in many respects, they were considered imminent unless predictable. In order of likely strategic importance, the key technologies to track were: conventional and nuclear hypersonic weapons, autonomous systems, and biological weapons.

The most significant concern is the inability to predict the development of space weapons against the background of increased competition in the gray zone and the possibility of armed conflicts. In addition, the associated unintended and uncontrolled escalation between the hegemon has been a cause for concern in many scenarios, as a reason to either build new strategic stability and possible arms control negotiations or to initiate an armed confrontation.

Thanks to the analysis of possible developments, we can summed up that the most likely new world order in the next decade will not be a monopolar or a bipolar world of the type Soviet-US confrontation. Instead, it could be an unstable polycentrism. Regardless of developments, the relative power of both the United States and China will be weakened or counterbalanced by the influence and independent foreign and security policies of India, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and other states.

The scenarios also feature a great deal of contestation of U.S. dominance, particularly by Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and their “unfair” play on the world stage. Although Russia will lose some economic power in this period, it remains the most problematic global player for the U.S. and its allies in the scenarios. Thus, cooperation with the Western World is possible only in issues of strategic stability.

Iran has begun to show aggression in scenarios where the United States has weakened its favor with its Middle Eastern allies. North Korea was a severe problem because of the expansion of weapons and rearmament programs in each scenario. However, it became more open to negotiation as the United States strengthened its position and China reduced its power.

Also, regardless of the scenario, violent extremist groups are projected to be active. Still, according to the projections, they will be more localized, and the influence of cross-national groups will be reduced significantly. Extremists will take advantage of the weakening of the U.S. or its seeming retreat from key regions in which they sought to consolidate gains and when they felt the weakening of U.S. cooperation with regional partners. At the same time, Saran S. (2021) believes that modern geopolitics is determined not only and not so much by these bipolarities but by new threats and the inability of the global world to respond adequately to them (see Fig. 1).




Figure 1: Factors Affecting the State of Modern Geopolitics  
Source: Developed by the authors

#### *China's Belt and Road*

The first factor affecting the future world order, the author calls the dramatic rise of China, which, thanks to the Belt and Road Initiative and advances in civilian and military technology, is becoming an inevitable reality. However, this factor would not be negatively influenced were it not for the country's international policies, which are distrusted by the United States and many of its allies (Saran, 2021).

#### *Closed Globalization*

In addition, hyper-nationalism and populism, for which globalization and multilateralism are an encroachment on the sovereign choices of powers, have increased due to the 2008 global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, a “closed globalization” is possible. Economic policies are no longer dictated solely by economic principles; they are now guided by considerations of strategy, political trust, climate, health, and technological threats. Countries like Britain, the U.S., and India have imposed trade restrictions, investment screening mechanisms, sanctions, and monetary policies that reflect these new trends. China has already worked out its distorted model of global integration.

#### *Small-Group Formation*

Frustration with multilateralism can be directly attributed to institutional inertia, lack of reform, and vested interests that continue to impede decision-making in international institutions (Patrick, 2015). Therefore, countries are leaning toward smaller groups to forge flexible partnerships on specific issues that accelerate cooperation among like-minded individuals. While this may be one way to overcome the malaise of international institutions, this tendency may hinder the development of broader and more coherent international strategies to combat “global disasters” from COVID-19 to climate change, that require the participation and commitment of all.

#### *War by other means*

Against the backdrop of a worldwide pandemic that deepened the crisis that began in 2008, geopolitics is being refocused to consider new actors, emerging factors, and considerations. Modern geopolitics is increasingly influenced by geoeconomics. Influential monographs such as *War by Other Means* by economist Jennifer Harris and diplomat Robert Blackwell speak of the systematic use of economic tools to achieve geopolitical goals. It is a form of governance that was present during the Marshall Plan and is present today in Chinese “checkbook diplomacy” and in the more general context of the “Belt and Road.

#### *IT as an innovative tool*

If the medium of communication is the message (McLuhan, 1964), then technology is the future of our politics. The advent of the fourth industrial revolution has led to the development of technologies that can be both a boon and a poison to humanity. America was the technological leader in the recent past. Still, China is now challenging this as it invests heavily in new and dual-use technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology. Pioneers can achieve technological leadership and become suppliers to other countries, creating asymmetric dependencies (Saran, 2021). A new field of interstate competition is opening up, where national security and strategic autonomy considerations imply technological choices and unique arrangements (Kryvtsova et al., 2021). In an increasingly digital world, the capture of data – not territory – and undermining critical information infrastructure – not state borders – are new security challenges for nations. As human attention and personal data become a coveted political reward, will the person become the next area of conflict.

While the factors above remain at the heart of the change, new players and geographic regions also affect geopolitics. Although the Coronavirus marked the return of the “nation-state,” cross-border communities pose a threat to sovereignty in the Westphalian sense. The concentration of economic resources and power in global technology companies, from Facebook to Tik Tok, has meant that states are no longer major players in the world. Hate, tribalism, and irrational ideologies have returned with renewed force, drawing on the reach and spread of digital technology. Technological giants now act as judges (Saran, 2021) of economic and political decisions and challenge the decisions of old political systems.

We believe that broad, inclusive debates about the prospects for a new world order could be an example of constructive

engagement in highly volatile times. In the face of global challenges, collective governance on a fair and equitable basis, the involvement of a wide range of countries in international political processes is required Paniuzheva M. (2021).

## 5 Discussion

The issue of the bipolarity of a polycentric world is quite debatable in academic circles. Many authors believe that today the world order is dictated by the policies of three countries at once: the United States, China, and Russia. For example, Morozov Y. (2020) shows the approaches of Russia and the United States to geopolitics and strategy in the regions of the world, taking into account the influence of China. Other researchers identify four leading players in the political arena. For example, Elamiryan R. (2020) analyzes the interests of the European Union, the United States, Russia, and China regarding the Eastern Partnership region. In his piece, the author reveals and discusses the complementary long-term interests of global players, which can become the basis for the mutual coexistence and development of a culture of cooperation for all actors involved. In turn, Kapkov S. (2009) shows that polycentrism is one of the directions of U.S. geopolitics, along with Atlanticism and Mondialism. On the contrary, Saran S. (2021) believes that U.S. hegemony is almost over due to the United States policy, which has been gradually isolating itself from the rest of the world since Barack Obama.

In his article Volodin A. (2019) explores the processes that took shape in the last 25 years of the twentieth century, which led to the formation of modern world politics and Russia's role in them. Today, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia is at the stage of recovery as a world state, and the monopoly influence of America on the world is gradually collapsing. Now there is a search for a new global consensus based on a universal/universal collective security system, with Russia at its core.

Along with the policy of large states, the military and economic independence of less developed countries are decreasing, as the powerful hegemon of the world political establishment are building subjective-objective policy against weaker states. Under such conditions, developing states tend to be subjects rather than objects of politics. At the same time, interaction with powerful forces becomes possible only through the unification of weaker countries. In particular, today's Central and Eastern Europe politics are shaping a new, post-liberal international order in which more vulnerable states do not feel sufficiently independent. Thus, in his work Bartoszewicz M. (2021) tries to reveal the relevance of creating the Three Seas Initiative. The 12 states of Eastern and Central Europe came together to reduce the influence of the big economies and minimize everything that hinders the development of the "Inter-Sea," the vast region between Berlin and Moscow.

In such a situation, contrary to the methods of civilized confrontation between states with different development levels, when geopolitical claims must be formulated and justified, today, the existing shares are resolved by war. In this case, both military actions and hybrid ones are used, based on information warfare and the war of new technologies. Under such conditions, today, there is a qualitatively new synthesis of military and civilian, primarily information and political, means of protection of geopolitical interests (Kovalev, 2018, Venediktov et al., 2021).

Actual conclusions present Kalyuzhnyj V. (2017). He indicates that today the world is in the crisis point of the bifurcation period when the monopolar geopolitical global structure order collapses and turns into a new type of world development. However, its contours are still tricky to outline because they are formed not by large forces clearly, but by a set of small, which may soon create new global polycentric geopolitics.

## 6 Conclusion

The question of the components of polycentric world order is quite debatable. Today it is impossible to indicate what will be the geopolitical distribution in the future. Still, it is possible to identify the essential components of the formation of this world order:

- 1) it will be based on innovative technologies that will influence world development;
- 2) information policy will be formed not only by the authorities of certain states, but also by independent information transnational companies;
- 3) to protect against the influence of large states, smaller ones will organize their alliances. It is not out of the question that the role of small states and their associations that will be core in shaping the world balance and security;
- 4) despite the current superiority of the U.S., given the scale of China's development today, we can talk about a possible future reorientation of geopolitics;
- 5) perhaps the development of a closed society will be formed not by economic goals but by preserving the culture and health of nations.

## Literature:

1. Bajkov, A., Agapova, E., Baklitskij, A. et al. (2020). International Threats 2021: Geopolitics Post-Pandemic: Report. *Laboratory for the Analysis of International Processes*, MGIMO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Moscow, p. 27. URL: <https://mgimo.ru/library/publications/int-threats-2021/>
2. Bartoszewicz, M. (2021). Interarium: A Bid for Polycentric Europe. *Geopolitics*, DOI: <https://doi.org/110.1080/14650045.2021.1973439>
3. Bogaturov, A. (2003). International order in the coming century. *International processes*, 1, p.11.
4. Elamiryan, R. (2020). Eastern Partnership Countries on the cross-roads of the Eurasian Geopolitics: USA, EU, Russia, and China. *The Kozmetsky Center of Excellence*. URL: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340363370\\_Eastern\\_Parternship\\_Countries\\_on\\_the\\_cross-roads\\_of\\_the\\_Eurasian\\_Geopolitics\\_USA\\_EU\\_Russia\\_and\\_China](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340363370_Eastern_Parternship_Countries_on_the_cross-roads_of_the_Eurasian_Geopolitics_USA_EU_Russia_and_China)
5. Garbuzov, V. (2019). Two bipolarities of the polycentric world. *Independent*. URL: [https://www.ng.ru/dipkurer/2019-12-22/9\\_7758\\_compromise.html](https://www.ng.ru/dipkurer/2019-12-22/9_7758_compromise.html)
6. Handley, J.(2021). Leading Polycentrically in mission. *Asian missions advance*, 9, pp.8-12. URL: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350795999\\_LEADING\\_POLYCENTRICALLY\\_IN\\_MISSION](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350795999_LEADING_POLYCENTRICALLY_IN_MISSION)
7. Kalyuzhnyj, V. (2010). Polycentrism Ideas: Myth or Reality. *Saratov University Bulletin*, 10 (2), pp. 96-100. URL: [https://www.sgu.ru/sites/default/files/journals/izvestiya/pdf/2013/12/13/2010.\\_tom\\_10.2.28.pdf](https://www.sgu.ru/sites/default/files/journals/izvestiya/pdf/2013/12/13/2010._tom_10.2.28.pdf)
8. Kalyuzhnyj, V. (2017). Polycentrism: preconditions for structural pluralization of relations. *International Journal of Applied and Basic Research*, 4 (3), pp. 601-604. URL: <https://applied-research.ru/ru/article/view?id=11524>
9. Kapkov, S. (2009). Polycentrism as the mainstream of modern American geopolitical thought. *POLITEX*, 2. URL: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/politsentrizm-kak-osnovnoe-na-pravlenie-sovremennoy-amerikanskoy-geopoliticheskoy-mysli>
10. Keersmaeker, G. (2015). Multipolar Myths and Unipolar Fantasies. *Security Policy Brief*, 60. Brussels, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations.
11. Kindleberger, Ch. (1973). *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*. London: Allen Lane.
12. Kovalev, A. (2018). The influence of geopolitical factors on ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation. *Management Consulting*, 6, pp. 53-62. URL: [https://old.sziu.ru/nepa.ru/images/nauka/UK\\_DOI/6\\_18/Kovalev\\_06\\_18.pdf](https://old.sziu.ru/nepa.ru/images/nauka/UK_DOI/6_18/Kovalev_06_18.pdf)
13. Kryvtsova, O., Karpa, M., Shvets, K., Lopatin, S., Yepryntsev, P., & Kryvtsova, V. (2021) Universally recognized and national principles of competence of civil servants as a basis for legal provision of information security: the experience of the European Union. *Ad Alta: Journal of interdisciplinary research*, 11(2), XXI, 48-53.

14. Lederleitner, M. (2021). Navigating Leadership Challenges in a Polycentric World. *Transformation An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies*, 38 (3), pp.240-253. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1177/02653788211030304>
15. Modelski, G. (1988). *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1993*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
16. Morozov, Y. (2020). China, U.S. and Russian campaigns in its struggle in the field of geopolitics in the regions of the world. *Russia and USA in XXI century*. URL: <https://rusus.jes.su/issue.2020.1.1/>. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.18254/S207054760009025-4>.
17. Paniuzheva, M. (2021). Four scenarios of the geopolitical world order for 2025–2030. from CSIS. *Russian International Affairs Council*. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/chetyre-stsenariya-geopoliticheskogo-miro-poryadka-na-2025-2030-gg-ot-csis/>
18. Primakov, E. (2011). *Thinking out loud*. Moscow: Rossiyskaya Gazeta, pp. 159-160.
19. Rasler, K. (1994). *The Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490-1990*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, p. 68.
20. Saran, S. (2021). Modern geopolitics: a race to stability through chaos. *Valdai International Discussion Club*. URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/sovremennaya-geopolitika-gonka-k-stabilnosti/>
21. Venediktov, V., Boiko, V., Kravchenko, I., Tyshchenko, O., Akimova, L., & Akimov, O. (2021) European standards of mediation in civil disputes and their implementation in Ukraine: theory and practice. . *Ad Alta: Journal of interdisciplinary research*, 11(2), XXI, 25-29.
22. Volodin, A. (2019). Formation of a polycentric world order as a continuation of the geopolitical processes of the twentieth century. *The contours of global transformations: politics, economics, law*, 12 (4). pp. 6-31. <https://doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2019-12-4-6-31/>

**Primary Paper Section: A**

**Secondary Paper Section: AD, AH**