

OVERCOMING THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY IN CONDITIONS OF WAR

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Abstract: The article examines evolution and shifts of paradigms of warfare and, accordingly, national security. The phenomenon of modern network centric warfare and extremely complex weaving of various players' interests is considered, and conclusion about systemic nature of national security patterns is made, implying corresponding modification of the methods and approaches to overcoming threats. The case of current Russia-Ukraine war is used for illustration of some suggested provisions.

Keywords: national security; warfare paradigm; network centric warfare; hybrid peace; national interests.

1 Introduction

War is an invariable companion of human history. Up to 95% of all societies known to history have used military action to resolve external or internal conflicts. According to scientists, over the past 56 centuries there have been about 14,500 wars, in which more than 3.5 billion people died [11]. To achieve 'the most desired results' in wars, the means of waging them, weapons and military equipment, tactics, strategy, and the like were constantly improved. An analysis of the nature of armed struggle, especially in recent decades, indicates a sharp increase in the impact of these components on the course and results of military operations. One can confidently say that weapons and military equipment today form the basis of the combat power of the armed forces of any state and are a decisive factor for success in a potential war or armed conflict.

Weapons must meet the most modern technologies, taking into account the nature of modern wars, which has changed significantly compared to even the recent past. While until recently the main goal of war was the destruction of the enemy through armed struggle and the seizure of its territory in order to use its industrial, raw materials, and labor resources for one's own purposes, a modern war can be waged and achieve its goals without this. Economic, political, informational, ideological, psychological, and other methods of conducting it are becoming increasingly important. Characteristic features of modern wars are also the following:

- A combination of military actions according to the rules of military science with partisan and terror-related actions
- Selectivity of objects to be damaged
- Increasing the role of remote combat with the use of high-precision (guided and unguided) weapons
- Carrying out targeted strikes on key facilities critical to the economy and infrastructure of the enemy state
- A combination of military and powerful political-diplomatic, economic, informational, cybernetic, psychological, humanitarian, and other influence on the enemy, and the like.

All this accordingly changes the landscape of national security in war conditions, and overcoming threats requires special maneuverability and agility, as well as a systemic vision, the ability to conduct retrospective and prospective analysis, take into account the interests of all stakeholders and the dynamics of the global geopolitical landscape, etc. [10; 15-20].

At the same time, the primary issue when considering security problems is the distinction between such important and fundamental categories as national security and national interests. Without realizing the fundamental difference between them, effectively overcoming threats to national security in war conditions is practically impossible [22; 27].

National interests represent a certain result of awareness of the values of the existence of a particular nation. Without national interests, a nation does not exist; it turns into a population, a people - an "open society" living in a certain territory, satisfying its narrow utilitarian needs. The presence of national interests indicates that a nation identifies itself as such, it distinguishes itself from other nationalities or ethnic groups, and most importantly, it proclaims the intention of further existence and progressive development in its own way based on its own historical traditions and way of life [12]. In turn, national security is nothing more than a type of social activity, the main purpose of which is to create favorable conditions for the implementation of these interests. Therefore, security as such, on the other hand, can also be considered as a national interest.

This means, in particular, that national security should be distinguished from global security, putting military security in its place along with many other equally important but different priorities. In its classical form, national security involves the defense of nation states from military aggression. More precisely, as Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states, it is about preventing or countering "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State." However, nation states now face other threats, including cyber attacks and terrorism, although in general such attacks are usually sponsored by one state against another, with the aim of threatening the territorial integrity or political independence of the country. Consequently, these threats can indeed be classified as subsets of military security [28].

Greater participation in global security efforts is also increasingly breaking down the boundary between "domestic" and "international" affairs and politics. Health, the environment, energy, cybersecurity and criminal justice have traditionally been considered domestic affairs, while issues relating to defense, diplomacy and development are viewed by foreign policy and security experts as entirely separate areas, involving relations between countries and international organizations. But this distinction is gradually being erased, and thus the circle of national security stakeholders is expanding, and to the maximum extent precisely in conditions of war. One should not forget about the so-called proxy wars, which experts define as "conflicts in which a third party indirectly participates in its own interests, providing one of the two conflict actors with military, organizational, resource, political, or other support" [29]. There is also another phenomenon that has become increasingly important lately - double proxy wars. It is about clashes in which the third party, behind which the state hides its participation, are transnational corporations (TNCs) that have in the country of conflict any interests in the or private military companies [27]. That is, even the actions of allies in war can pursue their own latent selfish interests. This can especially be observed, in particular, in the relations between various EU countries and the United States during the current war unleashed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Arms supplies to Ukraine inevitably imply changes in the military-industrial complex and approaches to the military-technical potential in these countries, which affects the interests of many players in economic, political, and military terms.

The above clearly demonstrates the critical complexity of the landscape of ensuring national security and overcoming threats to this security and, accordingly, the need to use the systemic and Agile paradigms.

2 Materials and Methods

The research was based on the works of various authors devoted to methodological and general theoretical problems of politics, geopolitics, military policy, state and military management, as well as research on the problem of ensuring national and military security of the state in sixth generation wars, in particular, under a network-centric nature of war.

In the process of work at various stages, a complex of theoretical and empirical, as well as applied and special methods of political science research was used (system activity approach, dialectical, systemic, comparative analytical, historical and logical, induction and deduction, normative and positive analysis and synthesis). But the system-activity approach, which acts as a synthesis of systemic and activity-based approaches, appeared to be the most effective, the main methodological tool, specifically in political science research.

3 Results and Discussion

An assessment of the military-political and military-strategic situation in various regions of the world shows that the transformation of the forms and methods of warfare that began more than twenty years ago has become increasingly relevant in recent years. In addition, understanding the significance of the strategy of "controlled chaos" led to certain changes in strategy: today, global players are increasingly striving to achieve their own goals not through direct conflict, but through the initiation and maintenance of conflict zones. The networking of the social structure of society, the emergence of radical semi-partisan groups in it, seeking to implement their own ideological principles, as well as the use of these new players in the interests of the main geopolitical centers of power leads to the fact that traditional security forces (both military and special) are increasingly losing the ability to operate effectively in new conditions of environment [1]. Events in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and other countries have shown that often an army built on traditional principles simply does not have time to carry out deployment activities and loses its combat effectiveness within the first hours after the start of the conflict.

It should also be noted that the duration of scientific and technological development cycles, as well as the costs of R&D in the field of defense has significantly increased. This leads to the fact that the latest models of weapons and military equipment are developed in a time frame that is unacceptable for the pace of development of modern society and the changing military-political situation (a good example is the fate of the American F-35 fighter project). In addition, the conflicts of recent years have also shown that many European countries, over the years of NATO membership, have lost the ability to independently plan and conduct operations with the large-scale use of military force. In cases where the development of the military-political situation led to the involvement of the armed forces of one or more European states outside the NATO bloc in the conflict, their use was not effective enough. The example of Ukraine is especially "textbook" in this regard - the country's military-industrial complex turned out to be unprepared for a military invasion of the Russian Federation, which created and continues to create a crucial threat to the national security of Ukraine in war conditions - the combat effectiveness of the army critically depends on the supply of weapons from the allies.

Also, the key way to such a non-military form of struggle is information warfare. On the one hand, the tools and methods of information warfare make it possible to obtain a highly effective and low-budget means of, if not victory, then influence. A powerful information-psychological impact on the personnel of the armed forces and the population of the country will significantly weaken the systems of state and military management and make the task of ensuring the sustainability of management one of the main ones. Thus, to successfully counter targeted destructive information influences on the system of state and military control, it is necessary to develop and implement fundamentally new decision-making algorithms and secure technical control tools, preferably domestically produced [9].

In the sphere of direct military conflict, aerospace weapons, as well as high-precision weapons, will become dominant, which will lead to the fact that the struggle for supremacy in the air and space will largely determine the development of operations on land and sea. The key systems in this case will be space communications, navigation, meteorology, optical and electronic intelligence systems [3]. At the same time, the historical experience of the 73-day war in Yugoslavia and especially the current war in Ukraine has shown that armed forces, technically equipped according to the model of the seventies and nineties of the last century, can successfully maintain combat capability even in conditions of almost complete enemy air superiority, but this requires fundamentally different approaches to ensuring the mobility of troops, as well as fundamentally different requirements for camouflage. All this, in turn, entails a change in technical means, technologies, and regulations for all types of communications at all levels of military and government administration - passive radar, reconnaissance and communications systems should dominate. In addition, the requirement for high mobility of troops simultaneously with the lack of access to satellite communications and navigation will require significant changes in the organization of communications, for example, the resumption of widespread use of tropospheric communications and the widespread introduction of inertial navigation systems [14].

The specificity of modern information technology revolution in military affairs is that it is based on a significant technological breakthrough specifically in the field of information technology. While previously the main efforts were concentrated on improving the strike and combat components of the armed forces, now advanced improvements affect, first of all, command and control systems, as well as intelligence systems. The technical side of the modern revolution in military affairs is based, first of all, on advances in the field of computer science and electronics, on improving the accuracy and range of weapons, the completeness and efficiency of reconnaissance and surveillance, increasing the ability to counter and suppress enemy defenses and effectively control troops.

Despite the initial focus on the technical aspects of the information technology revolution that had begun in military affairs, this process led to a fundamental revision of the entire military structure. The emerging opportunities to improve the technical characteristics of control systems make it possible to modernize not only individual types of weapons, but also the principles of control, use, and organization of the armed forces themselves. At the present stage, the ratio of political-diplomatic, economic, informational, psychological, and military means of struggle in the international arena has changed significantly. The importance and share of non-military means have increased evidently. In the context of globalization, the latter have become more purposeful and coordinated, and their technological equipment, scale and effectiveness have increased. In recent decades, in the course of confrontation in the international arena, entire states and coalitions of states have begun to collapse without the direct use of armed force. The main reason for this was crisis phenomena in certain countries and their internal instability, aggravated by the influence of external factors [25]. Such events in the international arena have at least an indirect and sometimes direct impact on the national security landscape during the war, as is clearly evidenced, for example, by the fluctuations in the political course of Turkey, which took on the role of the main intermediary in communication between Ukraine and the Russian Federation during war.

In general, the characteristic differences in the conduct of military operations within the framework of the traditional concept of warfare and the so-called "concepts built on the revolution in military affairs" are reflected in Table 1.

Table 1: Characteristic differences in the conduct of combat operations in traditional and new concepts of warfare

Components	Concepts built on revolution in military affairs	Traditional concept of "big battalions" (decisive role of force)
Task	Put the enemy's will, perception and assessment of what is happening under control	Gain decisive military superiority over enemy forces and assets
Purpose of military force	By controlling the enemy's will and ability to orientate, deprive him of any ability to act or respond to blows	Defeating the enemy by achieving superiority over his military potential
Scale of military power	It is possible to be inferior to the enemy numerically, the main thing is to have a decisive advantage in technical equipment, combat training, and methods of warfare	Large, well-trained and equipped forces with overwhelming superiority in technology and weapons
Scope of application	Universal	Faction versus faction combat (as well as support operations)
Speed	Is of fundamental importance	Desirable
Losses in manpower	May be slight on both sides	Potentially significant on both sides
Combat techniques	Paralyze the enemy's will, stun him, demoralize him, fetter him, destroy him	Systematic destruction of enemy personnel and equipment. In some situations, tactics that exhaust the enemy may be used

Schematically, the evolution of the warfare paradigm is depicted in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1. Trajectory of modern strategic-military evolution [5]

Thus, in essence, there is a Kuhnian "paradigm shift" in military affairs, and accordingly, just as research methods change in science when paradigms change, so methods must change in neutralizing threats to national security.

The legislation of a number of states considers an immediate threat of aggression as a basis for introducing martial law. At the same time, none of the known legislation contains an exhaustive definition of the immediate threat of aggression, leaving the solution of this issue to the discretion of the competent government authorities, which have the right to impose martial law throughout the country or in its individual localities. However, in any country, a martial law regime is distinguished by centralization of leadership and strengthening of the powers of military authorities, restriction of the rights and freedoms of citizens, and strengthening of legal liability measures in order to ensure this regime, maintain public order and security. In the territory where martial law has been introduced, all necessary measures are taken to organize the production of products, the

performance of work, and the provision of services for state needs, meeting the needs of the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies in accordance with wartime standards. Such transformations in themselves create new threats to national security - these are threats of a social nature, threats of excessive arbitrariness of security forces, marginalization and growth of discontent among certain categories of the population, the danger of splits in society, etc., as well as direct threats to the economic security of the state.

The curtailment of democracy, the virtual absence of real opposition, and the formation of a legal framework solely in the interests of the ruling oligarchy creates a real threat to the legal and internal security of the country as a whole when being in the conditions of war. Combined with the skillful activities of foreign intelligence services, this can lead to internal conflict and low-intensity civil conflicts.

The need to ensure a high standard of living for the population in post-industrial countries leads to the fact that the military-political leadership of the United States and Western European countries will only be able to afford to transfer the entire state to wartime mode only as a last resort. In the strategic deployment of the armies of developed countries, the main emphasis will be placed not so much on mobilization activities, but rather on the regrouping of combat-ready troops (forces) using their increased strategic mobility, ability to hit the enemy from long distances, including from advanced military bases, from aerospace space and from the World Ocean. At the same time, to achieve surprise in actions, strategic deployment can be carried out under the cover of air operations that have begun [23]. For states lagging behind in military-technical terms, strategic deployment is reduced mainly to the mobilization of a significant part of the population. The success of its implementation will depend, first of all, on the morale of citizens and their attitude towards the war. Thus, American psychologists and sociologists note that military personnel, mobilized under the threat of being held accountable and against their will, in situations involving risk to life, tend to get out of control, desert or surrender [28].

In a modern military conflict, such concepts as front and rear, line of combat contact, flanks, area of concentration, line of attack, and other terms undergo significant changes [9]. Analysis of the development of means of armed struggle allows concluding that the novelty of future operations will be determined, first of all, by the transfer of armed struggle to new spaces - real and artificially created [13]. The concept of a theater of military operations will lose its exclusively geographical meaning and will be perceived as a combat space that unites land and water areas, often separated by hundreds of kilometers, airspace, space, and the information environment [29]. The battlefield is being transformed into a kind of operational space, decomposed into small fields. When conducting combat operations, the effect of small battles arises between fully or partially autonomous groups. They can be separated by territory containing non-combatants, potential adversaries, and life support facilities for the population. As a result, the possibility and necessity of creating a continuous front line disappears; troops (forces) will have to be in constant readiness for a clash with the enemy, a quick transition from offensive to defensive and vice versa. The numerical advantage in each specific case will be created not by the overall large number of personnel, but by their mobility and the reach of weapons [23]. The current Russian-Ukrainian war, in fact, is the first real practical example of these assumptions.

It should also be noted that the high efficiency of weapons and the dynamics of changes in the situation during an armed struggle will increase the significance of management errors, and in some cases will not leave time and resources to correct them, so the need for proactive intelligence information will rapidly increase. To reduce the time delay between receiving information and its implementation, reconnaissance and destruction means should be integrated into unified systems by telecommunication networks connecting spatially distributed elements [9].

Fighting in future wars will become more difficult to classify as strategic, operational, or tactical, since the activity of each will have a direct impact on the overall situation. This has happened before, but now the close interconnection of events at the local, regional, and global levels has become the norm. An attack by a group of militants or the behavior of a soldier participating in a humanitarian operation can be replicated by the media and in a matter of minutes have an impact on the situation in a crisis zone. This fact confirms the conclusion about the "compression" of elements of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels within the scope of one conflict. Increasingly, actions at the tactical level affect the course of the entire operation, which leads to strategic consequences [26].

The importance of operations to ensure the safety of the territory and population from various destructive impacts on critical infrastructure will increase. For example, in the current war in Ukraine, air defense systems and other means of defense capable of protecting critical civilian infrastructure have acquired previously unheard-of importance, and are not inferior in strategic importance to offensive military equipment (fighters, etc.).

In the context of further strengthening of economic, environmental, demographic, and humanitarian interdependence of members of the world community, no state can afford victory at any cost. For the leading countries of the world, losses among personnel are becoming unacceptable, not to mention the threat to the safety of their civilian population. In addition, when starting hostilities, the future winner will have to think about the vanquished. After all, casualties among civilians can cause a serious international outcry, provoke a massive resistance movement, and the destruction of the economy is fraught with the transformation of a defeated country into a territory of permanent instability. The time factor also becomes critical, since prolongation of hostilities leads to loss of initiative, the risk of expanding the conflict, both in territory and in the composition of participants, and increased economic, moral and political costs [6].

From the point of view of methods and strategies for conducting military operations in the current, sixth generation, the ratio of direct and indirect actions changes most significantly. Indirect actions related to political, economic, and moral-psychological influence on the enemy, methods of disinformation and undermining from within, have always played a large role.

However, in the conditions of wars of the fourth and fifth generations, based on the ideas of total war, direct military actions often turned into an end in themselves, relegating indirect influences of an information-psychological and economic nature to the background.

In modern conditions, when nuclear weapons are turning into a deterrent, and the main goal of war is to defeat the economic potential of the enemy, the role of indirect actions increases significantly. It is about greater flexibility in the art of war, a more complete use of the entire variety of means and methods of warfare, including non-military and non-traditional ones.

A special place in the system of indirect actions is occupied by special methods of warfare, starting with psychological operations, subversive actions and ending with the operations of special forces. The entire armed struggle is permeated with extensive information warfare [24].

Thus, information warfare is increasingly becoming an integral part of combat operations. Without an advantage in this area, even the militarily stronger side will face serious difficulties in organizing and conducting combat operations. In technical terms, disabling the control system will be considered an important condition for defeating the enemy. Even before the start of hostilities, complete information superiority must be achieved, and with their start, the task is set to achieve "paralysis" of the enemy's control system in the shortest possible time.

Disruption of communication lines, massive failures in the operation of computer systems and failures of radio-electronic equipment will not allow the opposing side to conduct combat operations in an organized manner. The military-political leadership, military personnel and civilian population of the enemy are subjected to massive psychological influence in order to push them to consciously or spontaneously commit certain actions. Active propaganda is aimed both at its own population and at residents of "third countries" to create favorable domestic and foreign policy conditions for further warfare [14].

Therefore, in order to overcome the threats of IPSO, the leading and determining ones should be socio-political measures that help to gain the support of the main part of population.

Further development of views on the conduct of war shows that today's war is, firstly, a systemic war; secondly, war, where the main ones are the complex effects of the entire system.

Accordingly, patterns of countering threats to national security in a modern war must also be systemic in nature and be capable of launching entropy processes in the enemy's system of complex actions and at the same time achieving a synergy effect in overcoming threats. Such a task is very complex and requires continuous monitoring, analysis, forecasting, and agility.

The peculiarity of wars in the 21st century is that during the war, not only military facilities and troops come under enemy attack, but at the same time the country's economy with all its infrastructure, civilian population, and territory. A situation inevitably arises when the presence at least in one of the warring parties of insufficiently effectively defended and unprotected critical infrastructure facilities (hydroelectric power plants, nuclear, chemical, oil and gas storage facilities, and other similar economic facilities) can become a catastrophic environmental threat to all surrounding countries, and not just the warring ones. In this case, the goal of war shifts from the physical destruction of the enemy and the occupation of his lands to the subordination of the enemy to own will and inclusion of him in the sphere of influence on acceptable terms. The first example of the "practical implementation" of such a concept of war was the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian Army systematically launches missile attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine, especially in winter, trying to inflict maximum economic and social damage.

Thus, new remote methods of warfare include disrupting the functioning of the control structures of the attacked country, initiating a split in its political elites, and disrupting social stability through a combination of subversive psychological, economic, and social operations.

A new remote method of conducting armed struggle is the remote destruction of the economic potential of the state, at any distance from the enemy.

At the same time, the sequence of defeating the enemy may change: while previously it began with a decisive attack on the border groupings of ground forces, prospective means of high-precision destruction will make it possible, already during the initial operation, to disable the most important elements of the administrative and military control system, the military-industrial complex, transport and energy throughout the country [9]. In this regard, the spatial characteristics of the armed struggle are changing. Military actions are acquiring an increasingly pronounced volumetric (three-dimensional) dimension [11]. Ballin et al. [4] suggest the extension of classical concept of security as follows (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. The extension of classical concept of security [4]

Heerden and Goosen [8] present more ‘narrowed’ and practice-oriented vision of modern national security (see Fig. 3). It coincides with the above one in its essence, but restructured for practical rather than purely theoretical level.




Figure 3. Security's adjacent concept [8]

According to a number of American military experts, a new look at the threats of the 21st century is that today, even among traditional states, the difference between hostility and non-hostility is practically leveled out, since new methods of influence (such as intrusions into computer networks) make it difficult to accurately determine the time of the outbreak of hostilities [23]. In addition, it is assumed that in the future the main threat will come not from the regular armed forces of different countries, but from all kinds of terrorist, criminal, and other organizations, including non-state ones, whose participants are united on the basis of network structures [2].

Over the next 10 to 20 years, militaries will have to operate in an environment of increasing complexity, unpredictability, and dynamism. The use of asymmetric strategic concepts by a potential adversary and the widespread proliferation of remote weapons (primarily high-precision missile systems and means of information influence) will create an additional burden on all components of the armed forces and government. In the future, the conduct of combat operations will require not only an increase in the degree of interaction of forces and means, but also greater participation in them of other government agencies, departments and coalition partners. To achieve success in new conditions, it is necessary to have the ability to dynamically integrate a wide variety of forces and means to implement new capabilities that can potentially be obtained both by using the internal resources of the armed forces themselves, and by involving other government agencies, etc. It is necessary to reduce internal formal approval procedures in the interests of increasing the adaptability of the armed forces to new conditions. At the same time, increasing the level of integration of forces and means should be extended to the lowest level of management [7]. As the model of threats changes, the role and place of the armed forces in armed struggle also changes. A

greater emphasis is placed on conducting non-military operations, which requires increasing the importance of the information sphere of confrontation, as well as close interaction with non-state organizations and structures.

It should be noted that the end of the Cold War marked a change in the interpretation of issues of security. It is not surprising that its military component is changing as weapons systems improve and new ways of fighting emerge. For example, in the 1990s, the term “information security” and “information warfare” appeared in a specifically military sense. It is more important to pay attention to the expansion of content due to fundamentally new threats. In addition to the military block (hard security), a non-military block (soft security) began to be distinguished. Based on the scale and consequences, experts began to talk about the global dimension of security. This includes threats that require efforts to neutralize not just one state, even the most powerful, but many [3].

Current neorealism, instead of constantly increasing strength, places emphasis on the necessary level of state security. Security is interpreted in a relative sense: states strive to provide only such a level of power that allows them to survive [21]. Only the most powerful states can afford unilateral actions, so in ensuring security, for most countries, there is room for cooperation, albeit limited. In this new capacity, security is based on the cooperation of states, whereas in the traditional sense, national security was achieved through unilateral actions in conditions of competition. Meanwhile, a broad interpretation of security gives rise to additional practical difficulties that can only be resolved within the framework of the concept of “hybrid peace”.

The security dilemma is formulated as follows: when the costs of attack are assessed as lower than those of defense, the likelihood of war increases. If at the moment it is more advantageous to attack, then two states with equal forces cannot be equally secure, which provokes a mutual build-up of forces, an arms race, and in the future leads to war. Even if a state seeks security, the idea of a preventive strike against the enemy remains attractive to it. The advantage of an attack provokes power diplomacy, de facto politics and erroneous conclusions about the enemy, which in certain circumstances also bring war closer.

However, when a state, for reasons of profit, begins to invest in defense, it does not reduce the security of its opponents. It becomes possible to simultaneously strengthen the defense of many countries with a general stabilization of relations. Conditions for cooperation are created and the threat of attack is reduced. Relatively weak states may make attack by stronger opponents unacceptable if victory comes to them at too great a cost. Moreover, these weak states have favorable chances to strengthen this cooperation precisely during the war, in the wake of the political “halo” of allied assistance.

This provides the government with many key issues. The first step is to identify and prioritize: how can it continue to rank the many claims to national and international security? What sectors include essential public interests that need the government to assume a public role (as director or otherwise), and which do not? Securitization processes are driven in part by the development of the security agenda. It is consequently critical to prevent against ‘normative overdemand’ on the government. Naturally, prioritization is ultimately a matter of making political and normative decisions. However, reasonable considerations based on relevant knowledge and public discourse are required when making those judgments in order to take successful action and secure public support.

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